

2021-2022

US Safety Report

Uber

Trial Exhibit No.

04073

Table of contents

3	Introduction
4	Uber’s investments in safety
4	Community Guidelines
4	Access to the platform
5	Safety features
8	How Uber responds to safety incidents
9	Partnerships
11	Uber’s scale in the United States
12	Methodology and approach
14	Safety data
15	Motor vehicle fatalities
18	Fatal physical assaults
19	Sexual assault
22	Conclusion
24	Appendices
24	Appendix I: Terms used in this report
25	Appendix II: Uber safety incident data tables
26	Appendix III: RALIANCE: External validation of Sexual Misconduct and Violence Taxonomy for Uber
28	Appendix IV: GHSA: Independent validation of Uber’s methodology for analyzing fatal crashes
30	Appendix V: Challenges to comparisons: how Uber trips differ from the national average

Introduction



At Uber, safety never stops. We care deeply about the safety of the millions of people using our platform. Safety is embedded in our cultural values, and we strive to be the safest platform choice for everyone. Over the years, we've consistently raised the bar on safety by developing industry-first features, comprehensive education for our users, and close partnerships with experts, including advocates and law enforcement, who help guide our decisions.

In December 2019, Uber proactively released our first comprehensive US Safety Report, detailing our safety-related policies and processes and sharing data on the most serious safety incidents reported in relation to our platform. In doing so, Uber set a new industry standard for corporate transparency and encouraged others to do the same. We are proud to build on our safety reporting efforts by publishing Uber's third US Safety Report.¹

The data in this report shows that safety incidents are statistically extremely rare. Of the **over 1.8 billion US trips** from January 2021 to December 2022, **99.9998% ended without a critical safety incident of the kind included in this report, and 99.9% ended without any safety incident at all.**

But we know each safety incident represents the experience of a person and impacts individuals, families, and communities. We share this data to raise public awareness of safety and to work together on solutions across the transportation industry and society more broadly.

This report details Uber's latest investments in safety, our work with safety experts, and critical safety incident data for 2021 and 2022.

We remain committed to achieving our vision to be the safest transportation platform. We began reporting because secrecy doesn't make anyone safer. We have long advocated for companies to join our safety reporting efforts to help build a broad coalition of partners committed to safety and transparency.

Uber's investments in safety

Uber continues to demonstrate our commitment to safety through advancements in technology, rigorous standards, and the many safety features built into the user experience.

Community Guidelines



We believe everyone has the right to a safe experience while using Uber. Everyone who uses the platform is expected to follow [Uber's Community Guidelines](#), which are centered on 3 key principles: treating everyone with respect, helping to keep one another safe, and following the law.

Access to the platform

Uber continues to prioritize robust screening processes and technology to help strengthen the safety of our platform.

Every US driver undergoes a thorough screening before their first trip, including a motor vehicle records review and a criminal history background check.

- In 2021-2022, more than **750,000** prospective drivers did not make it through Uber's multistep safety screening process.
- In addition, Uber reruns criminal and motor vehicle checks each year, regardless of whether there is a statute or regulation requiring us to do so. We use technology to continuously check new criminal records. As of the publication of this report, more than **185,000** drivers have been removed from the app due to these continuous checks.

In response to feedback from drivers and national safety trends showing increasing levels of violence, we have enhanced rider verification processes.

- Uber blocks rider accounts with fake names, and we made it easier for drivers to flag rider accounts with fake or inappropriate names. To date, we have banned over 15,000 rider accounts from the platform as a result of these checks.
- Riders using anonymous forms of payment, like a gift card, are required to upload an ID before taking their first trip.
- More recently, we launched a new [verified rider](#) badge in more than a dozen US cities, including Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, and Portland. Drivers will now be able to see if a rider's identity has been verified, giving them more peace of mind when deciding to accept a trip.

Safety features

Core safety features

Uber has long invested in technology to promote safety on the platform. Some of Uber's core safety features include:²



Safety Toolkit

The blue shield on the map in the Uber app puts safety front and center, allowing users to explore, learn about, and easily access safety features while on-trip.



Anonymization

The app makes phone numbers and addresses anonymous to protect users' privacy.



Share My Trip/Follow My Ride

These rider and driver features, respectively, allow users to share trip details with designated loved ones who can follow along in real time.



RideCheck

This feature detects rare events like long stops, unexpected routes, or possible crashes and sends an in-app message to check in with both the rider and driver.



Driver and rider education

To help promote safe and respectful experiences, we share resources including [content](#) developed in partnership with RAINN, the nation's largest anti-sexual-violence organization.




In-app Emergency Button

Users can connect to emergency services, providing more accurate location data to first responders.



Live Help from a Safety Agent

At the tap of a button, users can get help, by phone or text, from a live safety agent from ADT.



2-way rating system

Drivers and riders can give each other ratings based on their trip experience.



PIN verification

This feature helps riders confirm that they're getting into the right vehicle by requiring a 4-digit code before a driver can start a trip.


Technology to improve road safety

Our work on safety is never done. We've continued to leverage technology to support safe driving behaviors.



Fewer left turns (new feature)

According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 22.2% of crashes in the US involve a vehicle making a left turn (compared with only 1.2% involving a right-hand turn).³ To help reduce risk, we have improved our in-app navigation to suggest fewer left turns with little to no impact on trip time.



Partially controlled intersection alerts (new feature)

Nearly half of all traffic injuries in the US occur at intersections,⁴ and intersections without signals are particularly risky. When a driver using Uber's in-app navigation is approaching an intersection without a 4-way stop, the app highlights this on the map screen with a message reminding them to watch for cross traffic.



Driving Insights (new feature)

This dashboard provides drivers with visibility into their driving habits and how to improve their driving safety.



Seat-belt alerts (enhanced feature)

Updated audio seat-belt alerts expand on our audio seat-belt chime, adding voiceover reminders for riders to buckle up. When a driver starts a trip, the rider will hear the reminder and receive a timely pop-up notification on their phone.

Technology to drive accountability and deter bad behavior

We're also investing in recording technology to promote accountability and deter bad behavior. Our aim is to reduce safety incidents and help provide better support to riders and drivers. We've worked to expand awareness and usage of existing features while designing new features that incorporate driver feedback, in line with the commitments we made in our last Safety Report.



Dashcam registration

Drivers with dashcams can register them in the Driver app and more easily share video footage with Uber. Uber can only view footage if drivers choose to share it when an incident is reported. Uber will also notify riders that their trip might be recorded if they're paired with a driver who has registered their dashcam.



Audio Recording

Riders and drivers can choose to record audio during their trip. To protect privacy, recordings are encrypted on the user's phone and can only be accessed by Uber if a user shares the audio as part of a safety-related report. Before the trip, we'll let the rider know in their app if a driver is using the feature, and vice versa.



Record My Ride (new feature)

Drivers can use the front-facing camera of their smartphone to record video without the added expense of a separate dashcam. Similar to our in-app Audio Recording feature, recordings are encrypted and cannot be accessed unless the driver chooses to submit the footage as part of a safety incident report to Uber.

Audio Recording is available nationwide for riders and drivers. Record My Ride has expanded to drivers in 35 states.

Raising awareness and usage of safety features

Uber aims to increase rider awareness and the usage of our existing safety features. In an effort to make it easier to leverage features in-app, we introduced [safety preferences](#). Safety preferences provide riders with a single place in the app where they can set up and schedule a bundle of selected safety features. Riders can set up personalized preferences—like Audio Recording, Share My Trip, PIN verification, and RideCheck—and schedule these safety tools to be activated at a certain time of day, or when coming and going to and from certain destinations. For example, a rider can set up Share My Trip when leaving a restaurant or bar after 9pm.

How Uber responds to safety incidents

Our aim is to support riders and drivers with empathy and care in times of need.

Reporting channels and response teams

We receive and proactively gather safety incident reports from more than 10 different channels, including our app, our critical safety line, social media, and law enforcement. We encourage feedback and reporting from all app users to help improve our safety processes and policies.

All potential safety-related reports are human-reviewed by specialized teams. When our support teams get safety-related reports, agents triage and classify the reports according to the description given by the person reporting the incident.

If anything happens, 24/7 support is available in the app from a specialized team of Uber agents who are trained to handle sensitive reports.

Safety Support teams

Our goal is to quickly respond to every report of a safety incident, handle it with care, and gather information to help prevent future incidents. As more and more people rely on Uber in their daily lives, we continue to invest in developing a robust—and growing—team of agents equipped with the tools and training to provide support to people when they need it most. Our US Safety Support is at the front lines of responding to and supporting people who report safety incidents to Uber.

Safety Support agents get over 200 hours of expert-informed and supervised on-the-job training on how to review and document reported safety incidents and recommend appropriate action for Uber to take. This covers the use of the Sexual Misconduct and Violence Taxonomy, an open-source tool developed by third-party experts in sexual violence (RALIANCE) to promote consistent, objective classification of sexual violence across industries. Agents also receive ongoing, tailored training in important areas such as phone investigation skills; trauma-informed support; identifying racism and discrimination in customer service; and addressing difficult, often emotional conversations with precision, empathy, and care.

As with all frontline and crisis-related roles, this is a hard job. Uber is committed to providing agents with ongoing support to help them cope with any possible stress, emotional concerns, and vicarious trauma.

Managing safety incidents

Uber's safety agents handle a wide range of incidents, and there is no one-size-fits-all approach to managing those incidents. These agents are often a first touchpoint for assistance after a traumatic event such as a serious crash or interpersonal incident.

- Our teams assess the situation, take preliminary action (such as account suspension), and determine next steps for response. Specialized agents provide dedicated customer support to riders and drivers dealing with the most serious and urgent incidents, such as reports of sexual assault, that require an in-depth review and support for the victim.
- They gather available data pertaining to an incident report (such as GPS information, timestamps, in-app communications, and photos/videos) and contact all involved parties, including reporting parties, potential victims, and accused parties.
- Agents are empowered to make immediate account-access decisions (such as whether to deactivate a user's account) and to provide victims with support resources (such as [Uber's Survivor Resources Hotline and Support Fund](#), developed in partnership with RAINN).

It's worth noting that while a single serious safety incident can be grounds for a rider or driver deactivation, the vast majority of reported incidents are less severe behaviors that may not warrant immediate removal from the platform, such as a single complaint about driving. These reports do, however, warrant further examination of the user's past behavior, and our systems are constantly working to identify patterns of potentially risky behavior. No rider or driver is deactivated from Uber for a safety-related report without a human review.

Partnerships

Uber continues to incorporate guidance from safety experts—including rideshare driver organizations, women's safety organizations, survivor and victims groups, law enforcement, road safety advocates, crime and fraud prevention experts, privacy organizations, and more—into all elements of our safety strategy.

We would not be where we are today without the guidance and support of experts and advocates, and we remain grateful for the opportunity to listen, learn, and partner with people around the globe as we honor the commitments we've made to prioritize key safety issues with the advice and guidance of experts.

Expanding Uber's Safety Advisory Board

We founded the [Uber Safety Advisory Board](#) in 2015 to provide critical external counsel on our approach to safety management, processes, and technologies. Since its inception, the Board has guided Uber's most important work on safety, including our commitment to safety reporting, creating industry-first programs like the Industry Sharing Safety Program, and developing in-app features like the Emergency Button and Live Help from a Safety Agent.

Former US Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh C. Johnson chairs the Board, which also includes leaders in gender-based-violence prevention and domestic-violence prevention, road safety, public health, workplace health and safety, and law enforcement. Since our last Safety Report, Uber has added 2 new members to the Safety Advisory Board: John L. Henshaw, former US Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, and Janet DiFiore, former Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals and former Westchester County District Attorney.

Members of the Uber Safety Advisory Board

- **Hon. Jeh C. Johnson (Chair)**, former US Secretary of Homeland Security
- **Hon. Janet DiFiore**, former Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals and of the State of New York
- **Tho Bella Dinh-Zarr, PhD, MPH**, former Vice Chairman and Acting Chairman of the US National Transportation Safety Board; Senior Advisor at the Traffic Injury Research Foundation and the FIA Foundation
- **Indira M. Henard, DSW, MSW**, Executive Director, DC Rape Crisis Center
- **John L. Henshaw**, former US Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health
- **Claire Jarashow, PhD, MPH**, former Director of the Vaccine Preventable Disease Control Program, Los Angeles County Department of Public Health
- **Erica Olsen**, Senior Director of the Safety Net Project, National Network to End Domestic Violence
- **John Pistole**, President of Anderson University; former Administrator of the US Transportation Security Administration and former Deputy Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Uber continues to reduce drunk-driving fatalities

Independent research in *The Review of Economics and Statistics* shows that Uber has a direct role in reducing drunk driving, decreasing overall traffic fatalities in the US by 5.2% where we operate, and saving more than 600 lives in a single year.⁵ Since our last report, we've continued to deepen our efforts to reduce impaired driving nationwide, partnering with Mothers Against Drunk Driving and state highway safety offices to support their efforts with free and discounted Uber rides.

Uber has saved more than 600 lives in a single year by reducing impaired driving on US roads.

Continuing our commitment to ending gender-based violence

In 2023, Uber [announced a commitment of \\$10 million](#) over 5 years for community partnerships working to end gender-based violence through Uber's Driving Change initiative. Uber is proud to partner with 7 organizations in the US: the National Alliance to End Sexual Violence, the National Network to End Domestic Violence, NO MORE, RAINN, RALIANCE, Rise, and Ujima. Uber's Driving Change partners have shaped our approach to safety. They've not only inspired innovative safety features but also helped us launch educational prevention and awareness campaigns (such as [NO MORE's "Stand up, don't stand by"](#) campaign) to increase visibility and action to help stop and prevent sexual violence. These endeavors continue the work we committed to publicly in our last Safety Report.

Supporting Vision Zero and the National Roadway Safety Strategy

In 2023, Uber joined the US Department of Transportation (US DOT) in its National Roadway Safety Strategy's "Call to Action" campaign for road safety. Coinciding with the one-year anniversary of the National Roadway Safety Strategy launch, we [announced](#) a series of new road-safety commitments, including supporting cities in reaching their Vision Zero goals, doubling down on our [proven impact in reducing drunk driving](#), and launching new bike safety features to help keep people on bikes safe.

Working with law enforcement

Uber is committed to [working closely](#) with law enforcement officials to promote safety within our communities. We have a dedicated global Public Safety Liaison team made up of former law enforcement professionals who work to proactively partner with law enforcement and educate them about how Uber can assist during an emergency or investigation. The team responds to all law enforcement data requests or connects with law enforcement directly through proactive referrals and engagements. It has, for example, provided prompt support for carjacking cases that are being investigated by law enforcement.

Delivering against our commitment to safety

In our last report, we set out a number of future investments in safety. We're proud to share that we've made progress against all these commitments. We know that our work on safety never stops, and we'll continue to do our part to create safer communities.

Reporting about safety We've continued to share information about the most serious safety incidents that occur in relation to our app.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Supporting driver safety We've continued to invest in driver safety, including piloting rider verification and expanding our recording technology, in order to promote accountability and deter bad behavior.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Preventing drunk driving Research shows that Uber has a direct role in reducing drunk driving where we operate. We're continuing our work with national partners and state highway offices to save more lives.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Supporting Vision Zero efforts We continue to work with partners to help cities reach their Vision Zero goals, and we're proud of the technology investments we've made since our last report to improve road safety.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Continuing the fight against gender-based violence Last year we announced Uber's renewed Driving Change program , which commits \$10 million to community partnerships working to end gender-based violence.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Expanding support to survivors and victims Uber's programs to support survivors and victims continue, including our Survivor Hotline and Support Fund in partnership with RAINN.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Uber's scale in the United States

When interpreting safety data, it's important to understand Uber's scale. The figures below provide an important backdrop to understanding the incident rates included in the "Safety data" section of this report.

Uber completed over **1.8 billion trips in 2021-2022 in the US**. That's over **2.5 million trips per day**, or almost **30 rides every second**.

US trips⁶

2021	2022
770 million	1.1 billion
2021-2022 total	2021-2022 average US trips per day
1.8+ billion	2.5+ million

US miles⁷

2021	2022
7.2 billion	10.3 billion
2021-2022 total	
17.5+ billion	

Uber customer support requests

For trips in 2021 and 2022:

- **1.2%** of trips had a support request of any kind, most frequently for issues such as lost items, cleaning fees, refunds, or route feedback
- **0.1%** of trips had a support request for a safety-related concern, the majority of which included more minor safety issues, such as complaints about driving or a verbal argument
- **0.0002%** of trips had a reported critical safety incident, which are the incidents referenced in this report

Methodology and approach

This report includes data about 3 categories of safety incidents reported on the Uber platform⁸ in the United States⁹ from January 1, 2021, to December 31, 2022: motor vehicle fatalities, fatal physical assaults, and 5 categories of sexual assault.

Uber's approach to reporting on safety data remains consistent with our previous Safety Reports.¹⁰ We continue to prioritize transparency, data accuracy, reliability, and consistency to ensure a measurable and repeatable process. To this end, we continue to be intentionally overinclusive when reporting this data.¹¹

Motor vehicle methodology

As with our previous Safety Reports, we continue to align our motor vehicle fatality reporting with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS), the national standard for motor vehicle fatality data.¹²

This report includes all fatalities involved in a crash, regardless of who was at fault or whether the deceased party was an Uber user. This methodology is unchanged compared to our prior 2 US Safety Reports.

Fatal physical assault methodology

This category of data is defined as an assault that resulted in one or more fatalities. This report includes incidents in which at least one of the following is true:

- At least one person on an Uber-facilitated trip was either the deceased or the accused¹³
- The incident occurred between parties that were paired by the Uber app and within 48 hours¹⁴ of the trip's completion

This approach is in line with industry standards and is consistent with Uber's previous reporting. We respond to all reports of physical assault following the processes outlined in this report.

Sexual assault methodology

Uber's approach to reports of sexual assault relies on learnings from our partnerships with experts and organizations that advocate against gender-based violence.¹⁵ In 2018, we partnered with safety advocates and experts to develop the Sexual Misconduct and Violence Taxonomy, which created an open-source uniform standard for classifying sexual assault and misconduct into 21 categories. Uber continues to use this taxonomy today to understand, document, and ultimately prevent sexual violence on our platform, as do other companies in the rideshare industry and beyond.

This report includes the 5 most serious categories of sexual assault: non-consensual kissing of a non-sexual body part; attempted non-consensual sexual penetration; non-consensual touching of a sexual body part; non-consensual kissing of a sexual body part; and non-consensual sexual penetration.

This report includes incidents that:

- Occurred during an active Uber-facilitated trip,¹⁶ not necessarily with individuals paired by the Uber app, or
- Occurred between individuals who were paired by the Uber app, within 48 hours of the trip's completion

Independent data validation

We take the accurate and consistent classification of safety incident reports seriously. To this end, we continue to partner with independent, third-party experts to validate our work.

- The Governors Highway Safety Association (GHSA), a nonprofit representing the state and territorial highway safety offices, validated Uber's approach to reconciling motor vehicle fatalities to FARS' data and concluded a 100% exact match
- RALIANCE, a national sexual violence prevention organization, validated Uber's application of the RALIANCE taxonomy and concluded that we were effectively using the taxonomy with a high degree of adherence

Limitations of Uber safety incident data

We recognize that this data and our user base are neither a representative national sample nor, necessarily, a representation of the size or scope of sexual assaults, motor vehicle fatalities, or fatal physical assaults in other contexts. In addition, COVID-19 affected how, where, and when people used Uber, which makes yearly comparisons a challenge. As such, and because significant demographic and methodological differences may be present, Uber urges caution in comparing the data contained in this report with the findings of national prevalence estimates.

Safety data

Context

In this section of the report, we provide a breakdown of the most serious safety incidents reported on the Uber platform in 2021 and 2022: motor vehicle fatalities, physical assault resulting in fatality, and sexual assault.

We publish this report against a backdrop of challenging national trends in the US during the reporting period.¹⁷ Motor vehicle fatalities reached the highest rates in recent history, with 2021 being the deadliest year since 2005.¹⁸ Homicides reached a record high in 2021,¹⁹ with carjacking increasing nationally, even doubling in some cities.²⁰ Sexual violence continued to be far too prevalent in society, affecting the lives of millions of people in the US.²¹ At our scale, Uber ultimately reflects the world in which we operate, and, as a result, we have also seen these troubling safety issues on our platform.

Overview

As shown in Uber's previous Safety Reports, critical safety incidents remain extremely rare. In fact, 99.9998% of Uber trips end without one of the safety incidents included in this report, and 99.9% of Uber trips end without **any** safety-related issue at all. During the timeframe covered in this Safety Report, Uber received reports of:

- 153 motor vehicle fatalities. Uber's motor vehicle fatality rate of 0.87 per 100 million vehicle miles traveled (VMT) remains substantially lower than the national average.²² Similar to national trends, over half of Uber-related²³ fatalities involved risky driving behavior, predominantly attributed to third-party drivers not operating on the Uber app.
- 36 physical assault fatalities. As homicides increased nationally,²⁴ Uber unfortunately also saw an increase in physical assault fatalities compared with our previous Safety Report.
- 2,717 incidents across the most serious categories of sexual assault and misconduct. This represents a decrease of 22% in the rate of reports compared with our second Safety Report, and an even larger decrease of 44% compared with our first Safety Report.

We know each report represents the tragic experience of a person and has devastating effects for individuals, families, and communities. We share this data to raise public awareness of safety and to work together on solutions (across the rideshare industry and in transportation more broadly). That's why our work on safety continues.


Motor vehicle fatalities

The year 2021 saw the highest number of traffic fatalities in the US since 2005 and the highest year-to-year percentage increase since at least 1975.²⁵ Although fatalities decreased in 2022, the national fatality numbers and rates were still far above pre-pandemic levels.²⁶ NHTSA continues to call out risky behaviors like alcohol-impaired driving, speeding, and not wearing a seat belt, which increased during the pandemic and continued even as the country began moving again.²⁷

Table 1: 2017-2022 motor vehicle fatality data, Uber-related and United States²⁸

Year	# of fatalities - Uber	Frequency of fatalities (by # of trips)	% of trips	Rate per 100M vehicle miles traveled - Uber	Rate per 100M vehicle miles traveled - National	Rate change over prior period - Uber (per 100M VMT)	Rate change over prior period - National (per 100M VMT)
2017-2018	107	~1 in 22,000,000	0.000005%	0.58	1.15	--	--
2019-2020	101	~1 in 20,000,000	0.000005%	0.62	1.22	+7%	+6%
2021-2022	153	~1 in 12,000,000	0.000008%	0.87	1.35	+40%	+11%

Figure 1: 2017-2022 motor vehicle fatality rate per 100M VMT, Uber-related and United States



Rate of motor vehicle fatalities over time: 2017-2022

Uber saw a decrease in the rate of overall crashes reported on the platform from 2017-2022. However, fatalities increased, mirroring national trends. The motor vehicle fatality rate on the Uber platform continues to be substantially lower than the national average.

Two national trends may have had an outsized impact on our platform: the increase in urban fatalities and the increase in risky behaviors such as speeding, alcohol-impaired driving, and wrong-way driving. Fatalities connected to these risky behaviors were overwhelmingly the result of third-party drivers who were not operating on the Uber app.

Impact of urban trends

In 2021, NHTSA identified a larger increase in fatalities occurring in an urban environment (+14%) compared with a rural environment (+5%). During this timeframe, urban fatalities represented 60% of overall fatalities nationally in 2021,²⁹ whereas urban fatalities represented 97% of fatalities on the Uber platform in 2021-2022.

Risky third-party behavior

NHTSA reported a continued increase in 2021 in risky driving behaviors, including alcohol-impaired driving (+14%) and speeding (+8%).³⁰ In fact, nearly one-third (29%) of nationwide fatalities involved speeding.³¹ This increase in risky driving behaviors continues to be reflected in our data. In 2021-2022, 56% of the fatalities on the Uber platform involved at least one of the following risky driver behaviors: alcohol-impaired driving, speeding, or wrong-way driving. Of these fatalities, nearly all—95%—were the result of third-party drivers not operating on the Uber app. In particular, the impact of third-party alcohol-impaired drivers shows up as a key factor in our data, with one-third of Uber-related fatalities attributed to third-party alcohol-impaired drivers.

One-third of Uber-related fatalities were attributed to third-party alcohol-impaired drivers.

Risky driving behaviors: impact on Uber-related fatalities

- 33% of fatalities involved an alcohol-impaired driver
 - 100% of these fatalities were attributed to third-party drivers
- 39% of fatalities involved a speeding vehicle
 - 93% of these fatalities were attributed to third-party drivers
- 13% of fatalities involved a driver driving the wrong way
 - 100% of these fatalities were attributed to third-party drivers




Figure 3: % of Uber-related fatalities involving risky driving behaviors





Figure 4: % of national fatalities involving risky driving behaviors³²



Third-party factors in motor vehicle fatality data

In order to be consistent with published NHTSA data, the data in this report does not consider fault.³³ Determining who is at fault in a crash can be challenging; it requires a significant amount of information-gathering from sources including police reports, investigations related to insurance claims, and facts uncovered in the course of litigation—and it can sometimes take years to resolve.

Now, however, nearly 5 years after the release of our first [US Safety Report](#), those processes are substantially complete. We reviewed the 97 fatal motor vehicle crashes reported to have occurred in 2017-2018. Our review of presently available facts indicates that:

- In 18% of the crashes, the actions of the driver using the Uber platform likely led to the crash (example: driver made an illegal turn, was cited by police and subsequently held liable)
- In 25% of the crashes, the actions of more than one party, including the driver using the Uber platform, may have contributed to the crash (example: intersection crash with multiple parties cited by police, eventual liability shared among parties)
- In 58% of the crashes, it appears that the actions of the driver on the Uber platform did not contribute to the crash (example: driver was rear-ended while stopped at a red light, police report cites third-party driver and no pending claim of liability made against the driver using the Uber platform)³⁴

We will continue to observe trends and evaluate opportunities to improve safety on the Uber platform. But as this review shows, there are often factors outside the driver's—or Uber's—control that contribute to these outcomes. Given the unfavorable national trends related to risky driving behaviors summarized earlier in this section, this dynamic may worsen over time.

Additional insights on Uber-related fatalities in 2021 and 2022

- 0.000008% of total trips, or about one in every 12,000,000 trips, resulted in a fatality
 - 153 individual motor vehicle fatalities occurred across 127 fatal Uber-related crashes
- 97% of fatalities occurred in an urban environment
- 45% of fatalities were individuals using the Uber app
 - 29% were riders, representing about one in every 43,000,000 trips
 - 16% were drivers, representing about one in every 76,000,000 trips
- 62% of Uber rider and driver fatalities involved third-party risky-driving behavior

Uber is committed to using our scale, reach, and technology to improve safety for people on and off the platform. Like our advocate partners and the USDOT, we've embraced the [Safe System Approach](#) to road safety. We continue to build new safety features (such as audio seat belt alerts) to address national trends and develop safer routing interventions (like intersection alerts and fewer left turns). In addition, we continue working to prevent impaired driving and promote bike safety.

Fatal physical assaults


In 2021, 26,031 people died due to homicide in the US, which marked the highest homicide rate in at least the previous 2 decades.³⁵ While the number of homicides declined slightly in 2022, they remained higher than pre-pandemic levels.³⁶ Government data sources also highlight a rise in aggravated assault,³⁷ and motor vehicle theft doubled in both 2021 and 2022 compared with pre-pandemic 2019.³⁸ And the increase in carjackings—which involve the perpetrator directly confronting the driver—is also reflected in trends around the country.

In 2022, the FBI released data regarding a new classification, carjacking, which is defined as a robbery offense in which the property stolen is identified as a vehicle.³⁹ The FBI data shows an 8.1% increase in carjackings from 2021 to 2022,⁴⁰ and these trends are even higher in certain cities. Data from the city of Chicago, for example, shows that aggravated vehicular hijackings, which includes carjackings with the use of a gun, nearly doubled (a 92% increase) from 2019–2020 to 2021–2022.⁴¹ Data from the Metropolitan Police in Washington, DC, reveals a similar trend, with a 78% increase in carjackings from 2019–2020 to 2021–2022.⁴² This increase in crime, some of which can escalate to homicide, is a tragic reality of the streets on which Uber operates across the nation.

Table 2: 2017-2022 physical assault fatality data⁴³

Year	# of fatalities	Frequency of fatalities (by # of trips)	% of total trips	Rate change over prior period
2017-2018	19	~1 in 122,000,000	0.000001%	--
2019-2020	20	~1 in 103,000,000	0.000001%	+18%
2021-2022	36	~1 in 53,000,000	0.000002%	+96%

Figure 5: 2017-2022 physical assault fatality rate



Nationally, 2021 marked the highest homicide rate in at least the last 2 decades.

Rate of physical assault fatalities over time: 2017-2022

Uber saw an increase in physical assault fatalities in 2021 and 2022. In a shift from our previous reports, 61% of fatalities were drivers using the Uber app and 39% were riders. In nearly half of all fatalities reported to Uber, the accused was a third party (neither a rider nor a driver on the Uber platform).

In this timeframe, we also saw a broader increase in motor vehicle theft reported on our platform. Nearly one-third of driver fatalities (32%) were reported to involve motor vehicle theft.

We're committed to helping create a safe experience for everyone who uses Uber. We owe it to the millions of drivers on our platform to make earning safer. That's why, in response to their feedback, we've launched industry-leading features like the verified rider badge, Audio Recording, and Record My Ride.

We also continue to partner closely with law enforcement investigations to help protect everyone using Uber and the broader communities we serve. Uber has a dedicated [public safety portal](#) for law enforcement officials, and our team of public safety specialists is available 24/7 to respond with data that may aid in an investigation. We respond to all requests from law enforcement.

Sexual assault

Sexual violence is a devastating and pervasive crime that profoundly affects every facet of society. In the United States, nearly 1 in 2 women and about 1 in 4 men experience some form of sexual violence in their lifetime.⁴⁴ Even though the majority of sexual violence is perpetrated by individuals known to the survivor,⁴⁵ no industry, institution, or aspect of public life is immune.


Categories of sexual assault

Consistent with our [previous Safety Reports](#), we include the 5 most serious categories in the Sexual Misconduct and Violence Taxonomy in this report.⁴⁶

Table 3: 2017-2022 sexual assault incident data, aggregated across 5 categories⁴⁷

Year	# of reports	Frequency of incident reports (by # of trips)	% of total trips	Rate change over prior period
2017-2018	5,981	~1 in 400,000	0.0003%	--
2019-2020	3,824	~1 in 500,000	0.0002%	-38%
2021-2022	2,717	~1 in 700,000	0.0001%	-22%

Figure 6: 2017-2022 sexual assault rate, aggregated across 5 categories



Both the rate and number of sexual assaults reported on the Uber platform have decreased over time. Since the release of our first Safety Report, we have seen a 44% decrease in the rate of reported sexual assault.

Individuals involved in sexual assault reports

Both riders and drivers report sexual assault incidents on the Uber platform. In this timeframe, 31% of sexual assault incidents were reported against riders⁴⁸ and 68% were reported against drivers. Only about 1% of reports were against a third party.

Figure 7: 5 categories of sexual assault, aggregated, by accused individual⁴⁹





Figure 8: Breakdown of each of the 5 categories of sexual assault by accused individual⁵⁰



National data shows that women are disproportionately affected by sexual violence.⁵¹ In Uber-related reports of non-consensual sexual penetration, women were 89% of the survivors, while men represented 8%.^{52, 53} The survivor was the rider the majority of the time.

Interpreting reports of sexual assault over time can be challenging. From year to year, as it becomes easier to report safety incidents (through on-trip reporting, for example), we may see an increase in reports. Similarly, as in this report, we may see a decrease in the rate of sexual assault—perhaps explained by a change in behavioral trends at scale, or by actions Uber has taken to remove bad actors from our platform or prevent them from joining in the first place.

Table 4: 2017-2022 sexual assault incident data, broken down by 5 categories⁵⁴

Years	Subcategory	# of reports	Frequency of incident reports (by # of trips)	% of total trips	Rate change over prior period
2017-2018	Non-consensual kissing of a non-sexual body part	1,164	~1 in 2,000,000	0.00005%	--
	Attempted non-consensual sexual penetration	587	~1 in 4,000,000	0.00003%	
	Non-consensual touching of a sexual body part	3,000	~1 in 800,000	0.00013%	
	Non-consensual kissing of a sexual body part	766	~1 in 3,000,000	0.00003%	
	Non-consensual sexual penetration	464	~1 in 5,000,000	0.00002%	
	Total	5,981	~1 in 400,000	0.0003%	
2019-2020	Non-consensual kissing of a non-sexual body part	650	~1 in 3,000,000	0.00003%	-37%
	Attempted non-consensual sexual penetration	284	~1 in 7,000,000	0.00001%	-54%
	Non-consensual touching of a sexual body part	2,054	~1 in 1,000,000	0.00010%	-23%
	Non-consensual kissing of a sexual body part	448	~1 in 5,000,000	0.00002%	-28%
	Non-consensual sexual penetration	388	~1 in 5,000,000	0.00002%	-6%
	Total	3,824	~1 in 500,000	0.0002%	-38%
2021-2022	Non-consensual kissing of a non-sexual body part	338	~1 in 6,000,000	0.00002%	-43%
	Attempted non-consensual sexual penetration	285	~1 in 7,000,000	0.00002%	+10%
	Non-consensual touching of a sexual body part	1,401	~1 in 1,000,000	0.00007%	-26%
	Non-consensual kissing of a sexual body part	338	~1 in 6,000,000	0.00002%	-18%
	Non-consensual sexual penetration	355	~1 in 5,000,000	0.00002%	0%
	Total	2,717	~1 in 700,000	0.0001%	-22%

We know that even one report of sexual assault or harassment is one too many, which is why we're continuing our work to end sexual violence on the Uber platform. We're focused on preventing bad actors from joining the platform and have put in place thorough and continuous driver screenings. All drivers joining the Uber app are offered educational content (developed in partnership with RAINN) that covers sexual violence awareness, bystander intervention, and strategies to promote safety on the Uber app.

We have also developed a number of features to help protect drivers and riders on the app—these include Share My Trip/ Follow My Ride, RideCheck, Audio Recording, and PIN verification (to help riders confirm that they're getting into the right vehicle). We recently introduced a "[safety preferences](#)" section in the app, where riders can set up and schedule these safety features.

Uber continues to partner with advocates and experts to help improve safety in our industry and in our communities. Through our [Driving Change initiative](#), for example, we help provide funding to organizations working to prevent, address, and respond to gender-based violence.

Conclusion

This report has shown that the vast majority of Uber trips—**99.9998%**—end without any of the kinds of safety incidents included in the report. But even one such safety incident is one too many, as it reflects the real, lived experience of an individual using the Uber app. This is why our work on safety continues.

Secrecy doesn't make anyone safer. This principle has shaped Uber's own approach to safety reporting, and we have long advocated for other companies to join us in sharing safety data consistently, accurately, and transparently as part of their commitment to safety.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has put out its first report on rideshare and taxi safety in the US,⁵⁵ and we welcome it as a vehicle for comparing data across industries and reporting periods. Uber will share critical sexual assault data with the GAO for inclusion in its report. We hope others in the rideshare and taxi industries will too. It is only through this kind of open collaboration that we all will gain a better understanding of the issues, truly work together on solutions, and hold one another accountable.

Uber Technologies, Inc.
San Francisco, CA
Published: August 30, 2024

Disclaimer: The data included in this report is being provided for informational purposes only and reflects incidents reported to Uber in numerous ways, as discussed further herein. The data consists of reported incidents that allegedly occurred in connection with (as defined here) an Uber-facilitated trip and includes such reports even if there is no allegation against a rider or driver connected with the trip. Given the limitations described herein, the report does not assess or take any position on whether any of the reported incidents actually occurred, in whole or in part. Accordingly, no data, analysis, statement, representation, or other content contained in this report can be relied upon by any party for any other purpose. This report is issued as of the publication date listed above. Uber has undertaken reasonable efforts to ensure that the data, analysis, statements, representations, and other content contained in this report are accurate as of the publication date and will not update the report or its contents after such publication date.

Appendix I

Terms used in this report

FARS

The Fatality Analysis Reporting System. Operated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), FARS is a nationwide census of fatal traffic crashes within the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.

Ridesharing (or rideshare platform)

For the purposes of this report, the Uber rideshare platform involves peer-to-peer ride services including but not limited to UberPool/UberX Share, UberX, Uber Black, Uber Black SUV, and UberXL. It also includes ride services in markets where professional rideshare drivers are commercially licensed (such as New York City).

Safety support agent(s)

Customer support personnel at Uber who are tasked with handling and responding to reported safety incidents and actioning user accounts as necessary.

Sexual assault

Based on the Sexual Misconduct and Violence Taxonomy, which provides a structure of consistent classification of reports of sexual violence, sexual assault is defined as any physical or attempted physical contact that is reported to be sexual in nature and without consent. This can include incidents within the taxonomy ranging from attempted touching of a non-sexual body part (for example, a user trying to touch a person's shoulder in a sexual/romantic way) to non-consensual sexual penetration. (For further sexual assault categories and their definitions, please see Appendix III: Sexual Misconduct and Violence Taxonomy in our [second US Safety Report](#).)

Sexual misconduct

The Sexual Misconduct and Violence Taxonomy defines sexual misconduct as non-physical conduct (verbal or staring) of a sexual nature that happens without consent or has the effect of threatening or intimidating the person against whom such conduct is directed. This can include incidents within the taxonomy ranging from staring/leering to verbal threat of sexual assault. (For further sexual misconduct categories and their definitions, please see Appendix III: Sexual Misconduct and Violence Taxonomy in our [second US Safety Report](#).)

Taxonomy

A system used for incident categorization. Uber's safety taxonomy is used to categorize safety incidents for proper agent routing, support protocol design, data tracking, and other purposes. The Sexual Misconduct and Violence Taxonomy, developed in partnership with RALIANCE, the National Sexual Violence Resource Center (NSVRC), and the Urban Institute, is used in this report to identify, categorize, and count sexually violent behaviors. In total, the taxonomy includes 21 categories of sexual misconduct and sexual assault behaviors. Data from the 5 most serious sexual assault categories in this taxonomy are presented in this report.

Third party

Any person who is not a driver, account-holding rider, or guest rider involved in a reported safety incident.

User

Any person using the Uber platform. For the purposes of this report, it pertains specifically to drivers and riders.

Victim/survivor

We've learned from safety advocates that people affected by sexual violence may identify in many ways, which can be deeply personal to the individual. In an effort to be inclusive and to ensure that all people impacted by sexual violence can identify with the language used in this report, Uber has chosen to use the terms "victim" and "survivor" throughout this report. Both terms are intended to refer to a person who has experienced any type of sexual misconduct or sexual assault.

Appendix II

Uber safety incident data tables

Table 5: 2017-2022 motor vehicle fatality data by year

Year	Motor vehicle fatalities	
	# of fatalities	% of trips
2017	49	0.000005%
2018	58	0.000005%
2019	59	0.000004%
2020	42	0.000006%
2021	73	0.000009%
2022	80	0.000007%

Table 6: 2017-2022 physical assault fatality data by year

Year	Physical assault fatalities	
	# of fatalities	% of trips
2017	10	0.000001%
2018	9	0.000001%
2019	9	0.000001%
2020	11	0.000002%
2021	16	0.000002%
2022	20	0.000002%

Table 7: 2017-2022 sexual assault incident data by year

Year	Non-consensual kissing of a non-sexual body part		Attempted non-consensual sexual penetration		Non-consensual touching of a sexual body part		Non-consensual kissing of a sexual body part		Non-consensual sexual penetration	
	# of reports	% of trips	# of reports	% of trips	# of reports	% of trips	# of reports	% of trips	# of reports	% of trips
2017	570	0.00006%	307	0.00003%	1,440	0.00014%	390	0.00004%	229	0.00002%
2018	594	0.00005%	280	0.00002%	1,560	0.00012%	376	0.00003%	235	0.00002%
2019	513	0.00004%	202	0.00001%	1,526	0.00011%	338	0.00002%	247	0.00002%
2020	137	0.00002%	82	0.00001%	528	0.00008%	110	0.00002%	141	0.00002%
2021	126	0.00002%	103	0.00001%	556	0.00007%	147	0.00002%	148	0.00002%
2022	212	0.00002%	182	0.00002%	845	0.00008%	191	0.00002%	207	0.00002%

Appendix III

RALIANCE

Creating Equitable, Respectful, and Safe Environments

External Validation of Sexual Misconduct and Violence Taxonomy for Uber: Statement of Findings

Background

In 2018, RALIANCE published a Sexual Misconduct and Violence Taxonomy⁵⁶ (Taxonomy) to track and codify reports of sexual misconduct and sexual assault. RALIANCE developed the Taxonomy for organizations to identify and track reports of sexual misconduct and sexual assault within their systems for purposes of resolution and accountability, as well as to inform their internal sexual violence prevention efforts.

In 2019, RALIANCE published its report Examining Uber's Use of the Sexual Misconduct and Violence Taxonomy⁵⁷ that validated Uber's use of the Taxonomy to classify incidents reported to have occurred in 2017 and 2018. In 2024, RALIANCE reviewed Uber's use of the Taxonomy again for incidents reported to have occurred in 2021-2022.

Purpose

To conduct an external validation of Uber's application of the Sexual Misconduct and Violence Taxonomy on identified incidents of concern, 2021-2022.

Sample

Similar to the approach used in the first and second Safety Reports, RALIANCE reviewed two sets of reports: a random sample of reports spanning the entire Taxonomy of Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Violence, as well as a non-random sample focused on the most serious reports. For the random sample, RALIANCE reviewed a sample of 383 reports from incidents reported in 2021 and 2022. The sample was representative of reports across the entire Taxonomy, and were selected by Uber using a power calculation to ensure that RALIANCE would have a subsample of incidents representative of the total sample with 95% confidence.

For the non-random sample which was focused on the most serious incidents such as attempted or actual contact, solicitation, masturbation/indecent exposure, verbal threats of sexual assault, or sexual assault, RALIANCE reviewed 200 incidents reported to have occurred in 2021 and 2022 in the United States. The purpose of this review was to further evaluate Uber's ability to apply the Taxonomy on the more severe, and infrequent events.

Uber staff members had previously coded all subsamples of incidents using the Taxonomy, allowing for external validation of Uber coding by RALIANCE. All tickets reviewed were from events that were reported to have occurred in the United States.

Methods

The external validation team, comprised of representatives from RALIANCE and an academic research group, reviewed the subsample of incident reports. Uber provided incident data without codes to allow for objective external validation. Incident tickets contained the incident information provided to Uber in text format. Uber redacted all personal information in tickets to ensure anonymity of all involved.

Each incident was reviewed independently by three members of RALIANCE's external validation team. External validation coders then met to review and discuss all coding to reach consensus on codes. Finally, RALIANCE compared the external validation team's coding against Uber coding for both the randomly and non-randomly selected subsamples to assess concordance (i.e., agreement between external validators and Uber) in coding and to determine reasons for discordance. In cases of ambiguity, where Uber coders categorized a given incident at a higher tier or comparable offense as compared with external validation coders, and the external validation coders found justification for higher tier or equivalent categorization, RALIANCE supported concordance with the Uber team. Concordance rates were calculated with updated data for the random and non-random incidents. Subsequently, we conducted Cohen's kappa statistic to account for potential concordance due to chance for both subsamples.

Results

For the random sample of 383 incidents from 2021 and 2022, RALIANCE found 82% concordance or inter-rater agreement between Uber team and RALIANCE reviewers. This concordance was found after excluding any disagreements between reviewers that were not meaningful, such as the example given above in our methodology. Those disagreements were typically a consequence of ambiguities in reports related to comments and gestures rather than physical contact-based violations. RALIANCE also used Cohen's kappa to confirm inter-rater reliability with consideration of probability of agreement based on chance. RALIANCE again found strong inter-rater reliability with a Cohen's kappa of 0.80.

For the non-random sample of incidents from 2021 and 2022 RALIANCE found very high concordance between Uber team and RALIANCE's sexual violence expert reviewers, 96%, and a corresponding Cohen's kappa of 0.96. These high concordance rates findings indicate reliable coding of sexual violence-related cases using this Taxonomy.

Conclusion

Our analysis indicates that Uber staff are effectively using the Taxonomy and coding the identified incident data with a high degree of adherence relative to what we see with coding from experts working on issues of sexual misconduct and assault.

Credits

Anita Raj, Ph.D. of the Newcomb Institute at Tulane University conducted sampling and statistical calculations for the sample from 2021-2022.

Appendix IV



Independent Validation of Uber's Methodology for Analyzing Fatal Crashes

Uber requested the assistance of the [Governors Highway Safety Association](#) (GHSA), a nonprofit association representing the state and territorial highway safety offices, to independently validate the motor vehicle section of this report. GHSA contracted with Dr. James Hedlund, Principal of Highway Safety North, who retired as Associate Administrator for Traffic Safety Programs after a 22-year career with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). Hedlund reviewed Uber's methodology using data from NHTSA's Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) as described below. Based on Dr. Hedlund's analysis, GHSA found Uber's methodology to be sound and agrees with the findings discussed in Appendix IV.

Uber supplied files with FARS case matches for most fatalities recorded by Uber in 2021 and 2022. The Uber files contained the FARS case number and, from both Uber and FARS files, the reported date and time, the latitude and longitude of the crash location (lat/long), and the vehicle identification numbers (VINs) of the involved vehicles. (Uber supplied only the VIN of the vehicle being used on their platform; FARS supplied VINs of all involved vehicles.)

The validation began by comparing the Uber and FARS dates and times. The Uber date-time was the time when the rider requested the trip. Uber also provided the trip duration, from the time when the driver picked up the passenger(s) to the time when the trip ended (often but not always the time of the crash). The FARS date-time was the time of the crash. Subtracting the trip duration time from the FARS crash time usually gives the Uber pickup time, but the time from the trip request time to the pickup time is unknown. This means that the Uber and FARS date-times cannot be matched precisely. They were considered matched if the unknown time from trip request to trip pickup was short, or if the trip continued after the crash. Using these criteria, all cases matched.

The Uber and FARS lat/longs were compared. Lat/longs can contain up to eight decimal places. A difference of one in the third decimal place translates to about 450 feet. The lat/longs were considered matched if they agreed this closely. If not, the two locations were compared via online open-source mapping and with the location recorded in other FARS variables. The Uber lat/long recorded where the trip ended. If the vehicle being used on Uber did not require towing from the crash scene, then the trip may have ended at a hospital or repair shop. Using these criteria, all cases matched.

The VIN provided by Uber and the FARS VINs were compared. Each file contained the first 12 characters of the 17-digit VIN. The vehicle with the VIN provided by Uber may not have been involved in the crash; for example, if the fatality was a rider crossing the road to meet up with the driver and was struck by another vehicle. If the VIN of the vehicle on the Uber platform did not appear in FARS, the make and model were identified with a VIN lookup. Uber staff reviewed these cases and all cases matched.

Uber also supplied files of fatal crashes occurring in connection with Uber's platform that appeared to have no match in FARS – eight in 2021 and fifteen in 2022. Each VIN from the Uber platform was compared with a sorted list of FARS VINs, and each case date-time was compared with FARS date-times from the hours before, during and after the case's reported hour within the state of the fatal crash (state was derived from lat/long provided by Uber). No matches were found for either comparison. This likely was because the Uber-related crash did not qualify for FARS, for example if the crash occurred in a parking lot or other location not on a public roadway.

Conclusion

Overall, the files provided by Uber contained 57 FARS case matches for 2021 and 70 FARS case matches for 2022. GHSA confirmed 100% of cases using the criteria described above for both years.

Appendix V

Challenges to comparisons: how Uber trips differ from the national average

While there are many similarities between our data and the national numbers, a direct comparison cannot be made due to demographic and methodological differences.

Demographic differences

Uber-related trips primarily occur in urban environments, with 97% of fatalities on the platform occurring in an urban setting in 2021-2022. NHTSA data shows that since 2016, fatalities on urban roadways have consistently been more frequent than they've been on rural roadways. In particular, from 2020 to 2021, urban fatalities increased nationwide by 14%, whereas rural fatalities increased only 5% in that same timeframe.⁵⁸

This difference affects which risk factors are more prevalent on the Uber platform relative to the national context, such as fatalities involving pedestrians or bicyclists⁵⁹ (defined as pedalcyclists in FARS).

Additionally, Uber's rigorous signup requirements mean that our demographics vary from the national average, in part because of the following factors:

- **Age and experience of driver:** Drivers on the Uber platform are subject to minimum age requirements and must have at least one year of license history. According to NHTSA, drivers aged 15-20 tend to have higher overall crash rates than older and more experienced drivers.⁶⁰
- **Motor vehicle records (MVR) check:** Uber screens every prospective driver's MVR for violations or crashes; verification of license status; and violations such as DUI, reckless driving, or evading police as reported by each state's Department of Motor Vehicles.⁶¹
- **Vehicle age:** Vehicles on the Uber platform are generally newer than the average age of other vehicles on the road (5 years old compared with 12 years old, respectively).⁶² NHTSA reports that newer vehicles are safer than older ones because they are more likely to include safety features like electronic stability control, backup cameras, and blind-spot detection.⁶³

Methodological differences

While we can reconcile fatalities reported to Uber uniquely against the FARS database (go to the "Motor vehicle fatalities methodology" and "Methodological differences" sections of our [second Safety Report](#)), the calculation for VMT (vehicle miles traveled) differs between Uber and NHTSA such that the comparison of motor vehicle fatality rates cannot be made directly.^{64, 65}

Uber considers only the Uber-related vehicle miles traveled, while NHTSA captures the vehicle miles traveled by all vehicles on the road. This key difference results in overcounting or overstating Uber's rate relative to NHTSA's "all vehicles" rate measuring the entire population.

For example, suppose that only blue and red vehicles exist on the road, that both sets of vehicles have driven 100 miles each, and that a collision between a red vehicle and a blue vehicle occurs, resulting in one fatality. Using a simple ratio of fatalities involving vehicles of one color divided by the miles traveled by vehicles of that color, the blue vehicle fatality rate would be 1 fatality/100 miles. The red vehicle fatality rate would be the same: 1 fatality/100 miles. Each rate is double counting the same fatality.

However, that fatality is only counted once when looking at the “all vehicles” rate, which includes the miles driven by both red and blue vehicles: 1 fatality/200 miles. Thus, the rate for both subsets (1/100 fatalities per VMT) is higher than the “all vehicles” rate (1/200 fatalities per VMT).

One could assign each fatal crash to a single vehicle to avoid double counting when multiple vehicles are involved. That is difficult to do consistently, however, especially without introducing a concept of fault, which is often disputed and often takes months or years to evaluate, as investigations, claims, and litigation processes play out. We have therefore not adjusted the rates shown for this effect, even though doing so would lead to a lower fatality rate for Uber-related trips.

Endnotes

1. Uber's [first US Safety Report](#) examined data from 2017 and 2018. Uber's [second US Safety Report](#) looked at data from 2019 and 2020. This report is Uber's third Safety Report and examines data from 2021 and 2022.
2. Core safety features can be found in the "Safety investments" section of Uber's [second US Safety Report](#) (pages 19-36).
3. Crash Factors in Intersection-Related Crashes: An On-Scene Perspective, NHTSA (September 2010), crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/811366.
4. About Intersection Safety, US Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration (accessed March 22, 2024), highways.dot.gov/safety/intersection-safety/about.
5. Uber and Traffic Fatalities, *The Review of Economics and Statistics* (October 23, 2023), direct.mit.edu/rest/article-abstract/doi/10.1162/rest_a_01395/117898/Uber-and-Traffic-Fatalities.
6. US trips are defined as any completed trip facilitated by the Uber rideshare app within the US (excluding US territories). Uber trips are rounded.
7. Miles driven is derived from the GPS data from Uber's rideshare app used by drivers and includes miles driven while the driver was on their way to the rider's pickup location, as well as the miles driven during rider trips. We have used Uber's best estimate in calculating the mileage. Uber miles are rounded.
8. For the purposes of this report, the Uber rideshare platform involves peer-to-peer ride services including, but not limited to, Uber Black, Uber Black SUV, UberX Share, UberX, and UberXL. It also includes ride services in markets where professional rideshare drivers are commercially licensed (such as New York City).
9. Excludes US territories.
10. This includes (but is not limited to) how we handle safety incident data and its collection, our safety support processes, and our safety incident data auditing processes. For additional information, go to "Methodology" in our [second US Safety Report](#) (pages 38-47).
11. For additional information, go to "Appendix I: Why data standards matter" in our [first US Safety Report](#), where we provide context on how adopting less inclusive data standards could adversely impact the overall dataset for reporting of these types of safety incidents (page 72).
12. Fatality Analysis Reporting System, NHTSA (April 2014), crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/811992.
13. For the purposes of fatal physical assault data classification for this report, Uber defines a trip for drivers as beginning when the driver has accepted the trip request in the app and is on their way to the rider's pickup location. For riders, a trip begins once they are picked up by their driver. In the rare event that a third party commits an act against a driver en route to the rider's pickup, this would be included in the dataset.
14. Incidents between parties paired by the Uber app may occur after the trip has ended. In general, post-trip incidents happen either immediately after the trip has ended or within a few hours of the trip's end. For audit consistency, and to err on the side of overinclusion, we determined that 48 hours is an auditable standard and adopted it for the purposes of this report only.
15. For additional information, go to the "Sexual assault standards" section in our [second US Safety Report](#) (page 30).
16. For the purposes of sexual assault data classification for this report, Uber defines an active trip for drivers as beginning when the driver has accepted the trip request in the app and is on the way to the rider's pickup location. For riders, an active trip begins once they are picked up by their driver. In the exceedingly rare case that a driver was sexually assaulted by a third party while on the way to the rider's pickup location, this would be included in the dataset.
17. As we highlighted in our [second US Safety Report](#) (covering 2019-2020), when interpreting Uber's safety data it's important to recognize that COVID-19 significantly disrupted patterns of movement, an impact reflected on our platform and on safety incidents (page 48).
18. Overview of Motor Vehicle Traffic Crashes in 2021, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (April 2023), crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/813435 (page 5).
19. Homicides are from CDC's "About Underlying Causes of Death, 2018-2022" request form wonder.cdc.gov/ucd-icd10-expanded.html.
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22. Overview of Motor Vehicle Traffic Crashes in 2022, NHTSA (June 2024), crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/813560.
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24. About Provisional Mortality Statistics, CDC (accessed in March 2024), wonder.cdc.gov/mcd-icd10-provisional.html.
25. Overview of Motor Vehicle Traffic Crashes in 2021, NHTSA (April 2023), crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/813435 (page 5).
26. Overview of Motor Vehicle Traffic Crashes in 2022, NHTSA (June 2024), crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/813560 (page 3, Figure 1).
27. Overview of Motor Vehicle Traffic Crashes in 2021, NHTSA (April 2023) crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/813435 (page 12).
28. Uber occasionally receives notice of a possible safety incident well after the trip was taken (sometimes years after). This is extremely rare for fatalities, but for this reason the data may change over time. The motor vehicle data presented in this report includes incident reports submitted on or before June 30, 2024. The motor vehicle data in this report is reconciled to [2022 FARS data](#).
29. Overview of Motor Vehicle Traffic Crashes in 2021, NHTSA (April 2023), crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/813435 (page 19, Figure 9).
30. Overview of Motor Vehicle Traffic Crashes in 2021, NHTSA (April 2023), crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/813435 (page 2).
31. "Almost One-Third of Traffic Fatalities Are Speed-Related Crashes," NHTSA (July 10, 2023), nhtsa.gov/press-releases/speed-campaign-speeding-fatalities-14-year-high.
32. NHTSA Fatality and Injury Reporting System Tool (FIRST), NHTSA with FARS data (accessed April 1, 2024), cdan.dot.gov/query.
33. See [Appendix V: Challenges to comparisons: how Uber trips differ from the national average](#).
34. Percentages are rounded and may not sum to 100%.
35. Derived using homicides rates from CDC's [About Underlying Cause of Death 1999-2020](#) request form for years 1999-2020 and the homicide rate from CDC's [About Underlying Cause of Death, 2018-2022](#) request form for the year 2021.

36. The 2018-2022 homicide fatalities are from CDC's [About Underlying Cause of Death, 2018-2022](#) request form.
37. Aggravated assault data is from the FBI's [Crime Data Explorer](#) (CDE) through its Uniform Crime Reporting Program, which collects data from participating law enforcement agencies. The number of agencies participating is subject to change year over year.
38. Calculated by filtering for "motor vehicle theft" and year using FBI data, CDE (accessed March 26, 2024), [cde.ucr.cjis.gov/LATEST/webapp/#/pages/explorer/crime/crime-trend](#).
39. UCR Summary of Crime in the Nation, 2022 (October 6, 2023), [cde.ucr.cjis.gov/LATEST/webapp/#](#); landing page: [hsdl.org/c/abstract/?docid=883640](#) (page 31).
40. UCR Summary of Crime in the Nation, 2022 (October 6, 2023), [cde.ucr.cjis.gov/LATEST/webapp/#](#); landing page: [hsdl.org/c/abstract/?docid=883640](#) (page 31).
41. 2-year aggravated vehicular hijackings for Chicago is calculated by adding the number of reported incidents for both years using the [City of Chicago - Crime Data Portal](#). The rate change from 2019-2020 to 2021-2022 is based on the calculated 2-year aggravated vehicular hijackings.
42. 2-year carjackings for Washington, DC, are calculated by adding the number of carjacking offenses for both years from the [Metropolitan Police Department Carjacking Interactive Dashboard](#). The rate change from 2019-2020 to 2021-2022 is based on the calculated 2-year carjackings.
43. Uber occasionally receives notice of a possible safety incident well after the trip was taken (sometimes years after). This is extremely rare for fatalities, but this means that the data could change over time. The data presented in this report includes incident reports reported on or before June 30, 2024.
44. "The National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey: 2016/2017 Report on Sexual Violence," NISVS (June 2022), [cdc.gov/nisvs/documentation/nisvsReportonSexualViolence.pdf](#).
45. "Perpetrators of Sexual Violence: Statistics," RAINN (accessed August 23, 2024), [rainn.org/statistics/perpetrators-sexual-violence](#).
46. Please go to our [second US Safety Report](#) for definitions and additional information on the 5 most serious categories (pages 56-66).
47. Uber occasionally receives notice of a potential sexual assault well after the trip has ended. The sexual assault data presented in this report includes incidents reported on or before June 30, 2024, and for this reason may change over time.
48. Riders are defined as Uber account holders and guests of account holders.
49. The proportion of incidents broken down by the reported-against party are rounded and may not sum to 100%.
50. The proportion of incidents broken down by the reported-against party are rounded and may not sum to 100%.
51. Scope of the Problem: Statistics, RAINN (accessed August 23, 2024), [rainn.org/statistics/scope-problem](#).
52. For the purposes of this report, the gender analysis is limited to the non-consensual sexual penetration category and is the result of a manual audit. A core limitation in Uber's data is that gender (and other demographic) information is not collected from riders generally. Therefore, an analysis of how victimization by gender may vary across subcategories is not currently available. (For additional information, go to "Limitations of Uber safety incident data" in the "Methodology" section of our [second US Safety Report](#).)
53. In 3% of incidents, the survivor's gender was unknown.
54. Uber occasionally receives notice of a potential sexual assault well after the trip has ended. The sexual assault data presented in this table includes incidents reported on or before June 30, 2024, and for this reason may change over time.
55. Ridesharing and Taxi Safety: Information on Assaults Against Drivers and Passengers, US Government Accountability Office (February 22, 2024), [gao.gov/products/gao-24-106742](#).
56. "Helping Industries to Classify Reports of Sexual Harassment, Sexual Misconduct, and Sexual Assault," RALIANCE (2018), [raliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/helping-industries.pdf](#).
57. "Examining Uber's Use of the Sexual Misconduct and Violence Taxonomy and the Development of Uber's United States Safety Report," RALIANCE (November 21, 2019), [raliance.org/report_posts/examining-ubers-use-of-the-sexual-misconduct-and-violence-taxonomy/](#).
58. Summary of Motor Vehicle Traffic Crashes, NHTSA (October 2023), [crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/813515](#) (page 9).
59. Rural/Urban Comparison of Motor Vehicle Traffic Fatalities, NHTSA (May 2024 [Revised]), [crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/813486](#).
60. Young Drivers, NHTSA (June 2022), [crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/813313](#).
61. In New York City, the MVR screening is conducted through the NYC Taxi and Limousine Commission. The TLC driver licensing process is separate from the process described here.
62. Average Age of Vehicles in the US Increases to 12.2 years, According to S&P Global Mobility (May 23, 2022), [spglobal.com/mobility/en/research-analysis/average-age-of-vehicles-in-the-us-increases-to-12-2-years.html](#).
63. How Vehicle Safety Has Improved Over the Decades, NHTSA (accessed March 19, 2024), [nhtsa.gov/how-vehicle-safety-has-improved-over-decades](#).
64. To learn more about our motor vehicle fatalities data reconciliation process, please see pages 40-42 in our [second US Safety Report](#).
65. Please see page 53 of our [second US Safety Report](#) to learn more about the methodological differences in calculating VMT that prevent comparison of motor vehicle fatality rates.