

Metadata

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A/C Privileged
Policy and Comms Safety needs 2017

Issues we'd like prioritized

Onboarding

- **MVR and BGC reruns:** Establishing 24 month re-runs in places where we are not currently required to do re-runs (or whatever cadence makes most sense).
- **Vehicle inspections and recalls:** Validating our new video vehicle inspection model, and better messaging to drivers about recalls and/or rider feedback about the condition of their vehicles and their corresponding responsibilities.
- **Screening processes outside of the US:** Auditing what onboarding teams in-country are doing, checking to see if they line up with regs in places where we have them, and putting a defensible standard in place where there are no regs
- **BGC accuracy and accountability:** Improving the error rate for BGCs in the U.S., which is 1 in 500. This may explain the rise of press stories, like [this](#), [this](#) and [this](#), featuring drivers who should never have gained access to the app. Note, we increasingly encounter situations where drivers slip through committed crimes in counties outside their county of residence.

On-trip

- **Cash safety:** Figuring out the root of the safety risk related to cash—is it identity, expanded geography, cash itself, or something else?
 - *NB: JVH, Frank and Dorothy's team already working on this*
- **Crashes/collisions:** Learning more about why crashes/collisions occur on Uber, whether there are any related patterns (e.g. tickets noting driver distraction), and if the current training program to boost ratings actually makes a difference.
- **Telematics:** Using contextualized speed/braking thresholds instead of ones that are less defensible, learning how the team classifies dangerous driving tickets, and what actions we can/do take in response to those tickets.

Offboarding

- **Enforcement:** Establishing clear processes for a) deactivating drivers and riders who violate our Community Guidelines; and b) allowing them back on Uber. We struggle with consistent enforcement on ratings and it seems that different standards may be granted to power drivers—many drivers who've fallen well below stated rating thresholds are still driving with 2k+ trips.
- **Interpersonal incident data:** Ensuring we follow up on each reported incident to rectify our internal data so it's accurate and reliable, figuring out our reported incident rate per-region (e.g. via a support ticket audit with corresponding insurance information), under-reporting rates, and analyzing patterns associated with incidents, especially sexual assault. It'd be helpful to figure out whether previous incident patterns indicate that we should revise our urgent support logic / arbitrary "3 strikes you're out" rule.
- **Quality class for bad drivers:** Revising the current class to make it more relevant for safety. The current class (summarized by ops [here](#)) is insufficient and asks

multiple choice questions like “Why is it important for drunk riders to be in the back seat?” with the answer “So they’re not in the driver’s seat.” We’re told that ~95%+ drivers easily pass the class and as a result, we’re seeing increasing [press scrutiny](#) on drivers with bad feedback on the road.

- **Point of contact for safety investigations:** Designating someone from Safety to work with comms to gather and report the facts to key stakeholders (comms/policy/legal) during complicated safety investigations (ie. Boston minor rape, Minneapolis BGC investigation, etc) and be held accountable for getting the facts right. Today multiple people whose core job responsibilities lie elsewhere end up running complicated safety investigations in addition to handling our external response to incidents, which over-complicates the situation.

Overall

- **Privacy/consumer protection risks:** Accounting for privacy and discrimination risks *prior* to when products/features are built and developed (e.g. Bouncer and Dolby).
- **Increasing privacy protections (e.g. riders’ addresses):** Building features to obfuscate riders’ home addresses. Through IRT and in the press (with stories like [this](#)), we hear a variety of concerns about drivers knowing where riders live. Today drivers have access to pick-up/drop-off addresses even while they’re being investigated; riders have the option to enter in cross-streets only in a handful of US cities; and phone number anonymization doesn’t exist everywhere.
- **Driver hours and road safety:** Auditing incentives to make sure they aren’t causing drivers to be on the road [upward of 24 hours](#) at a time. For example in [Manila](#), we offer a bonus for drivers who complete 18 trips/day, and drivers say they are on the road most of the day because the average trip takes one hour to complete. Similarly, the costs of our rental/leasing agreements may mean that drivers are on the road for long stretches. Recently a rental partner in the UK that installs videos inside their cars caught drivers [falling asleep at the wheel](#) after driving 23 hours consecutively, and our South Africa team has mentioned that drivers need to drive 80+ hours a week to make their vehicle financing payments. This issue has recently [begun popping up](#) in the US.

Basic universal truths we want to be able to say

- Every driver on the Uber app is screened.
- We require XX information from every rider and driver / no trip is anonymous.
- Riders and drivers can contact each other anonymously through the Uber app anywhere in the world.
- We have trip records for every single ride from beginning to end.
- If we find out that a driver/rider poses a safety risk to the Uber community, we take immediate action.
- Drivers and vehicles on the Uber app are no less safe than the average driver or fleet of vehicles in XX city/country.

